Morgan (John) vs. State (Nev. Supreme Ct. – May 3, 2018)
The State used a peremptory challenge to strike a prospective juror, an identifiably gay member. The defendant made a Batson challenge against the State’s strike based on sexual orientation.
On October 30, 2014, Maria was working as a manager at an AM/PM convenience store when she saw a man grab a package of mixed nuts and put them into his pocket. Maria approached the man while he was at the checkout counter trying to pay for another item and asked him if he could please take out what he had placed into his pocket. The man told Maria to “get the f_ _ _ out of [his] face,” and as she backed up in response, he approached and hit her in the chest. Maria fell to the ground, got up, and hit the man’s backpack with a stick as he left the store. The man’s backpack ripped and containers of soup fell out. Maria called the police and indicated where the man departed. Police detained the man and identified him as Morgan. The State then charged Morgan by way of criminal complaint and information with one count of robbery and one count of battery with intent to commit a crime.
In February 2016, a three-day trial ensued. During jury selection, Morgan moved to strike the jury venire and requested an evidentiary hearing because there were only African-Americans in the 45-person venire. The district court denied Morgan’s motion. Morgan renewed his motion for an evidentiary hearing after the district court discovered that one of the African-American veniremembers was ineligible to serve on the jury. The district court initially denied Morgan’s renewed motion but subsequently held a hearing to determine the merits of his motion, and the district court again denied Morgan’s motion.
In conducting voir dire, the district court explained that it would first ask the jury panel general questions before the parties could request to strike jurors for cause. The district court further explained that it would then seat 13 of the remaining individuals from this panel inside the jury box and the parties would take turns asking questions. If both parties passed for cause after questioning, a party could choose to exercise a peremptory challenge on their turn. However, the district court stated that the parties would lose their peremptory challenge if they decided not to use it. Morgan opposed this “use or lose” method of exercising peremptory challenges, to no avail. Subsequently, the State used a peremptory challenge to strike juror no. 24, one of the two identifiable gay veniremembers. Morgan challenged the State’s strike based on sexual orientation because the State asked juror no. 24 whether he said “boyfriend, girlfriend or married,” in response to the juror’s reply when asked about relationship status. The State justified its strike by explaining that juror no. 24 expressed an approval of the media’s criticism towards police. Morgan contended that other jurors shared the same view on police criticism in the media, but that these individuals served on the jury because they were heterosexual. The district court, however, denied Morgan’s challenge.
Ultimately, the jury found Morgan guilty of robbery and misdemeanor battery. The district court sentenced Morgan to serve his two counts concurrently for a maximum of 120 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 26 months and 533 days’ credit for time served. Morgan appealed.
On appeal, Morgan contended, among other issues, that the district court erred in overruling his Batson challenge.
The State used its second peremptory challenge to strike prospective juror no. 24, an identifiably gay member. Morgan made a Batson challenge against the State’s strike based on sexual orientation. Although the district court never made a finding as to whether Morgan made out a prima face case of discrimination, it denied Morgan’s challenge. Before addressing Morgan’s contention that the district court erred in overruling his Batson challenge based on sexual orientation, the Supreme Court of Nevada first addressed whether sexual orientation should be recognized under Batson – a novel issue before the Court.
The Court explained that the use of peremptory challenges to remove potential jurors on the basis of race is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Diomampo v. State, 124 Nev. 414, 422, 185 P.3d 1031, 1036 (2008) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986)). The scope of Batson has been expanded “to prohibit striking jurors solely on account of gender.” Watson v. State, 130 Nev. 764, 774, 335 P.3d 157, 165 (2014) (citing J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140-43 (1994)). Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to address whether Batson extends to sexual orientation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded in the affirmative. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 486 (9th Cir. 2014). In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit first established that classifications based on sexual orientation are subject to heightened scrutiny, and the court further concluded that equal protection prohibited striking a juror on this basis. Id. at 484. The Ninth Circuit elucidated how “[g]ays and lesbians have been systematically excluded from the most important institutions of self-governance.” Id. Moreover, “[s]trikes exercised on the basis of sexual orientation continue this deplorable tradition of treating gays and lesbians as underserving of participation in our nation’s most cherished rites and rituals.” Id. at 485. Such strikes “deprive individuals of the opportunity to participate in perfecting democracy and guarding our ideals of justice on account of a characteristic that has nothing to do with their fitness to serve.” Id. In sum, “[t]he history of exclusion of gays and lesbians from democratic institutions and the pervasiveness of stereotypes [led] [the Ninth Circuit] to conclude that Batson applies to peremptory strikes based on sexual orientation.” Id. at 486. Thus, the Court adopted SmithKline’s holding and expanded Batson to sexual orientation.
The Court noted that in addressing whether the district court erred in overruling Morgan’s Batson challenge based on sexual orientation, “the trial court’s decision on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent represents a finding of fact of the sort accorded great deference on appeal.” Diomampo, 124 Nev. at 422-23, 185 P.3d at 1036-37. Thus, the Court will not reverse the district court’s decision unless clearly erroneous. Watson, 130 Nev. at 775, 335 P.3d at 165.
The Court further noted that it evaluates an equal-protection challenge to the exercise of a peremptory challenge using the three-step analysis set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Batson. Id. at 774, 335 P.3d at 165. Accordingly, the Court engages in the following analysis:
(1) the opponent of the peremptory challenge must make out a prima facie case of discrimination, (2) the production burden then shifts to the proponent of the challenge to assert a neutral explanation for the challenge, and (3) the trial court must then decide whether the opponent of the challenge has proved purposeful discrimination.
Ford v. State, 122 Nev. 398, 403, 132 P.3d 574, 577 (2006).
The Court explained that in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the first step of the Batson analysis, “the opponent of the strike must show that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” Watson, 130 Nev. at 775, 335 P.3d at 166. This step is not onerous and “the opponent of a strike is not required to establish a pattern of strikes against members of the targeted group.” Id. However, “[w]here there is no pattern of strikes against members of the targeted group to give rise to an inference of discrimination, the opponent of the strike must provide other evidence sufficient to permit an inference of discrimination based on membership in the targeted group.” Id. at 776, 335 P.3d at 166. Thus, the opponent of the strike must provide “something more” to satisfy the first step. Id. For example, “circumstances that might support an inference of discrimination include, but are not limited to, the disproportionate effect of peremptory strikes, the nature of the proponent’s questions and statements during voir dire, disparate treatment of members of the targeted group, and whether the case itself is sensitive to bias.” Id. at 776, 335 P.3d at 167. To successfully establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on sexual orientation, the opponent of the strike may produce evidence that “[the prospective juror] was the only juror to have identified himself as gay on the record, and the subject matter of the litigation presented an issue of consequence to the gay community” SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 476. However, even though striking one or two gay individuals “may not always constitute a prima facie case, it is preferable for the court to err on the side of the defendant’s rights to a fair and impartial jury.” Id.
The Court explained that juror no. 24 was not the only juror to have identified himself as gay on the record. The State did not use a peremptory strike against the other identifiable gay member, and thus, this individual served on the jury. Accordingly, there was no pattern of strikes against gay members, no disproportionate effect of peremptory strikes, and no disparate treatment of gay members. With regard to the nature of the State’s questions and statements during voir dire, although the prosecutor inquired about juror no. 24’s relationship status by asking him whether he said “boyfriend, girlfriend or married,” which prompted juror no. 24 to answer “partner,” the prosecutor intended to inquire about his marital status and not his sexual orientation, despite not phrasing the question as married, single, or divorced, as the prosecutor did with other prospective jurors. Finally, the nature of Morgan’s criminal case did not involve an issue sensitive to the gay community. Therefore, because the Court was not convinced that the totality of the circumstances gave rise to an inference of discrimination, it determined that Morgan failed to make out a prima face case of discrimination.
The Court further explained that the State, as the proponent of the peremptory challenge, provided a neutral explanation for the challenge that proved it did not engage in purposeful discrimination. After the State asserts a neutral explanation for its peremptory challenge, “the defendant bears a heavy burden in demonstrating that the State’s facially []neutral explanation is pretext for discrimination.” Conner v. State, 130 Nev. 457, 464, 327 P.3d 503, 509 (2014). Thus, “to carry that burden, the defendant must offer some analysis of the relevant considerations which is sufficient to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that the State engaged in purposeful discrimination.” Id. Relevant considerations include, “(1) the similarity of answers to voir dire questions given by veniremembers who were struck by the prosecutor and answers by those veniremembers of another [sexual orientation] who remained in the venire,” and “(2) the disparate questioning by the prosecutors of struck veniremembers and those veniremembers of another [sexual orientation] who remained in the venire.” Id. Additionally, “[a]n implausible or fantastic justification by the State may, and probably will, be found to be pretext for intentional discrimination.” Id. “The court should evaluate all the evidence introduced by each side on the issue of whether [sexual orientation] was the real reason for the challenge and then address whether the defendant has met his burden of persuasion.” Kaczmarek v. State, 120 Nev. 314, 334, 91 P.3d 16, 30 (2004).
The Court determined that the prosecutor provided the district court with a neutral explanation for striking prospective juror no. 24. The State contended that juror no. 24’s response during voir dire indicated an approval of the media’s criticism of the police, because after the prosecutor asked who had strong feelings about the criticism of police officers portrayed in the media, juror no. 24 responded that he felt “that it’s about time that the police officers . . . are being charged” and that he thought “it’s gone on way too long that [the police officers have] been able to abuse the public.” In response to the State’s neutral reason for striking prospective juror no. 24, Morgan argued that the State’s reason was pretextual because prospective juror no. 27 shared a similar view concerning police criticism in the media, but he was heterosexual and served on the jury. The district court overruled Morgan’s Batson challenge after it determined that the State had reason to strike juror no. 24, and after it discredited Morgan’s argument that sexual orientation was the real reason for the strike.
On appeal, Morgan additionally argued that heterosexual prospective juror no. 31 similarly expressed concern about police in the media but served on the jury. Thus, Morgan contended that the State’s justification was implausible. The Court noted that the record reflected that prospective juror no. 24 had a stronger opinion on police criticism than prospective juror nos. 27 and 31, and thus, juror no. 24 provided a dissimilar answer when compared to the heterosexual veniremembers who served on the jury. Moreover, the record indicated that the State asked the other identifiable gay veniremember who served on the jury whether he was “married, single, [or] divorced,” instead of phrasing the question “boyfriend, girlfriend or married,” and thus, the State did not engage in disparate questioning. Therefore, the Court determined that Morgan failed to demonstrate that the State’s neutral explanation for striking prospective juror no. 24 was pretextual and that the district court properly overruled Morgan’s Batson challenge.