Is illegally obtained evidence admissible in a custody proceeding?

Vintage photograph of women with headset listening to a recording

Abid vs. Abid (Child Custody) (Nev. Supreme Ct. – Dec. 7, 2017)

In this child custody proceeding, a father surreptitiously recorded his child and ex-wife’s conversations by hiding a recording device in the child’s backpack. Because neither the child nor the mother consented to this recording, the father’s actions likely violated NRS 200.650, which prohibits the surreptitious recording of nonconsenting individuals’ private conversations. The question presented is whether the district court abused its discretion by providing the recordings to a psychologist appointed by the court to evaluate the child’s welfare.

Sean and Lyudmyla Abid divorced in 2010. Their stipulated divorce decree awarded them joint legal and joint physical custody of their one-year old child. In 2015, Sean moved to modify those terms to get primary physical custody.

On at least two separate occasions, Sean placed a recording device in the child’s backpack as the child traveled to Lyudmyla’s home. The child and Lyudmyla were unaware of the device, and neither consented to Sean recording their conversations. Sean then edited the recordings, removed what he claimed to be irrelevant material, and destroyed the originals. Claiming that the recordings demonstrated Lyudmyla’s attempts to manipulate the child, Sean moved to admit them into evidence in the custody proceeding. Lyudmyla objected on grounds that Sean violated NRS 200.650 in recording her and the child’s private conversations.

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Nevada Appellate Courts Advance Opinions for December 7, 2017

Nevada Appellate Courts Advance Opinions for December 7, 2017

MULLNER (TROY) VS. STATE

  • Can a court consider felony convictions originating from juvenile offenses in habitual criminal sentencing.

IN RE: PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.L.

  • When does a parent lack standing to challenge a court’s placement decision following the termination of his or her parental rights.

AGWARA VS. STATE BAR OF NEVADA

  • Can an attorney assert his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination to quash subpoenas issued by the State Bar that seek production of client accounting records and tax records.

NEVILLE, JR. VS. DIST. CT. (TERRIBLE HERBST, INC.)

  • Does NRS Chapter 608 provide a private right of action for unpaid wages.

ABID VS. ABID (CHILD CUSTODY)

  • Is illegally obtained evidence admissible in a child custody proceeding.

DOE VS. STATE, LEGISLATURE OF THE 77TH SESSION

  • Does Nevada’s medical marijuana registry violate the Due Process, Equal Protection, or Self-Incrimination Clauses of the United States or Nevada Constitutions.

Visit the Nevada Appellate Report for more legal news.

Does Nevada’s wiretap law permit interception of cellular phone calls and text messages?

Sharpe v. State (Nev. Supreme Ct. – June 4, 2015)

The issue is whether Nevada wiretap law allows for the interception of cellular telephone calls and SMS text messages. More specifically, whether NRS 179.460(1)’s mention of “wire or oral communications” includes cellular telephone calls and SMS text messages, considering that similar federal statutes were updated to include “electronic communications,” while NRS 179.460(1) was not.

In 2010, officers began investigating Sharpe after receiving information that he distributed methamphetamines. Approximately four months into their investigation, officers obtained a warrant authorizing a wiretap to intercept communications on two different cellular telephone numbers attributed to Sharpe. The wiretap resulted in the interception of both telephone calls and text messages. After collecting sufficient intelligence, officers obtained a search and seizure warrant for Sharpe’s residence and vehicles.

Four days after obtaining the search and seizure warrant, due to intelligence gathered from physical surveillance and the wiretap, officers anticipated that Sharpe intended to purchase a large quantity of methamphetamines. After observing the presumed drug deal, officers pulled Sharpe over and arrested him. During the arrest, officers confiscated approximately 3.25 pounds of methamphetamines from Sharpe’s vehicle. Almost simultaneously, officers executed the search and seizure warrant at Sharpe’s residence and confiscated small amounts of various drugs and drug paraphernalia.

Sharpe was charged with four drug-trafficking-related felonies. After pleading not guilty on all four counts, Sharpe filed a motion to compel further discovery, two motions to suppress evidence obtained from the wiretap, a motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his vehicle, and a motion for a Franks hearing. The district court denied all five motions.

Subsequently, Sharpe pleaded guilty to trafficking in a controlled substance, level III, based upon the 3.25 pounds of methamphetamines confiscated from his vehicle. Sharpe, however, reserved his right to appeal the denial of the aforementioned five motions. On October 18, 2013, the district court sentenced Sharpe to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after serving 10 years, $235 in fees, and a $50,000 fine.

Although Sharpe raised a multitude of issues on appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court considered a specific issue originating from his second motion to suppress the wiretap. In that motion, Sharpe argued that the fruits of the wiretap should be suppressed because Nevada law does not allow for the interception of cellular communications.

The Nevada Supreme Court explained that in response to the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), Congress undertook to draft comprehensive legislation both authorizing the use of evidence obtained by electronic surveillance on specified conditions, and prohibiting its use otherwise. This legislative effort resulted in the enactment of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Title III allowed for the interception of both wire communications and oral communications as long as certain requirements were met.

The 1968 Senate Report on Title III states that: “[t] he proposed provision envisions that States would be free to adopt more restrictive legislation, or no legislation at all, but not less restrictive legislation.” Accordingly, states were allowed to adopt their own wiretap laws, as long as they were at least as restrictive as federal legislation.

In 1968, Nevada law was already more restrictive than federal law. Eleven years earlier, the Nevada Legislature had enacted what is now NRS 200.650. At the time, NRS 200.650 prohibited a person from “surreptitiously listening to, monitoring or recording, or attempting to listen to, monitor or record,” i.e., eavesdrop, a private conversation via a device, unless authorized to do so by one of the persons engaged in the private conversation.

In 1973, the Nevada Legislature passed Senate Bill 262, which proved for Nevada’s wiretap statutes and introduced the two statutes at issue in this appeal, what are today NRS 179.455 and NRS 179.460.

The relevant portions of these Nevada statutes have remained the same since 1973. But federal wiretap law kept developing.

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