Gathrite v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (Nev. Supreme Ct. – Nov. 7, 2019)
At issue is whether evidence that has been suppressed in justice court proceedings on a felony complaint can be presented to the grand jury in support of an indictment.
Stemming from Gathrite’s alleged involvement in a deadly shooting, the State filed a criminal complaint in the justice court charging Gathrite with murder with use of a deadly weapon and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. Before the preliminary hearing, Gathrite moved to suppress his statements to the police and the gun discovered as a result of his statements, alleging that the police had violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The justice court granted the motion and ordered the statements and the gun suppressed. The State did not ask the justice court to reconsider its decision or appeal the justice court’s decision to the district court. Instead, the State voluntarily dismissed the criminal complaint without prejudice and went to the grand jury solely on a charge of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, presenting the evidence that the justice court had suppressed. The grand jury indicted Gathrite on one count of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person.
Gathrite filed a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging, among other issues, the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the indictment. Gathrite primarily contended that the State erroneously presented evidence to the grand jury that had been suppressed in the justice court proceedings and did not present the grand jury with the suppression ruling. In deciding the petition, the district court reviewed the justice court’s suppression ruling. After conducting an evidentiary hearing and determining that the evidence was not obtained in violation of Gathrite’s constitutional rights, the district court denied the petition. Gathrite filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the Supreme Court of Nevada.
In the petition, Gathrite argued that insufficient legal evidence was presented to the grand jury because the State only presented evidence that had been suppressed by the justice court in earlier proceedings on a criminal complaint for the same felony offense. The Court explained that the Legislature has directed that the grand jury can receive none but legal evidence, and the best evidence in degree, to the exclusion of hearsay or secondary evidence. NRS 172.135(2). In this respect, the Legislature has provided greater evidentiary constraints in grand jury proceedings than are provided in the federal system. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956) (“[N]either the Fifth Amendment nor any other constitutional provision prescribes the kind of evidence upon which grand juries must act.”). The Court then explored the meaning of “legal evidence” as used in NRS 172.135(2).
The Court explained that at the time NRS 172.135 was enacted, Black’s Law Dictionary defined “legal” as “required or permitted by law; not forbidden or discountenanced by law; good and effectual in law” or “[p]roper or sufficient to be recognized by law; cognizable in the courts.” Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951). Black’s Law further defined “legal evidence” as “all admissible evidence,” and “admissible evidence” as evidence that “is of such a character that the court or judge is bound to receive it; that is, allow it to be introduced.” Putting these definitions together, the Court concluded that “legal evidence” as used in NRS 172.135(2) means evidence that is admissible under the law. Accord Mott v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. Rptr. 247, 248 (Ct. App. 1964) (explaining that under a California statute that provided “none but legal evidence” may be presented to a grand jury, “a grand jury may receive only the same type of evidence which a court of law may entertain, i.e. legally competent evidence”); see also Sara S. Beale et al., Grand Jury Law and Practice § 4:21 (2d ed. 2018) (“Although there are generally no cases interpreting these provisions [that use the term ‘legal evidence’ in describing the evidence that a grand jury may consider], the general intent appears to be to require legally admissible evidence.”). That understanding of “legal evidence” also finds support in the rest of NRS 172.135(2), which excludes “hearsay or secondary evidence” from a grand jury proceeding. See Beale, supra, § 4:21 (“This inference [that ‘legal evidence’ means legally admissible evidence] is strongest in the case of the statutes that specifically prohibit the admission of hearsay or secondary evidence.”). Evidence that has been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights therefore is not “legal evidence” for purposes of NRS 172.135(2) because such evidence is not admissible. See Rosky v. State, 121 Nev. 184, 191, 111 P.3d 690, 695 (2005) (recognizing that statements obtained in violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, made without the Miranda warning, are inadmissible at trial); Osburn v. State, 118 Nev. 323, 325 n.1, 44 P.3d 523, 525 n.1 (2002) (recognizing that evidence obtained as a consequence of lawless official acts is excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree); see also NRS 48.025(1)(b) (“All relevant evidence is admissible, except . . . [a]s limited by the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Nevada . . . .”).
The State argued that it was not bound by the justice court’s suppression ruling when it went to the grand jury and therefore the evidence suppressed by the justice court could be presented to the grand jury without violating NRS 172.135(2). As support for that position, the State relied on Sheriff v. Harrington, 118 Nev. 869, 840 P.2d 588 (1992). The Court concluded that reliance was misplaced.
In Harrington, the justice court dismissed a felony DUI count, determining that a prior DUI conviction was constitutionally infirm and therefore could not be used to enhance the charged offense to a felony. The State subsequently obtained a grand jury indictment for felony DUI, relying upon the same prior DUI conviction that the justice court had determined was constitutionally infirm. Harrington challenged the indictment in a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the decision of the justice court was exculpatory evidence that the State was required to present to the grand jury under NRS 172.145(2). The district court agreed and dismissed the case. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the justice court’s decision was not evidence. Rather, the justice court’s decision was a legal opinion about an issue relevant to sentencing. Likewise, the Court noted that a judge’s suppression ruling is not evidence, and thus, Harrington closed the door on Gathrite’s argument that the State had to present the justice court’s suppression ruling to the grand jury. But, the Harrington court did not consider whether evidence suppressed by the justice court is legal evidence for purposes of NRS 172.135(2)—that statute is not mentioned at all in Harrington. Consequently, the Court determined that Harrington did not support the State’s argument relating to NRS 172.135(2).
The State also argued more broadly that the justice court’s suppression ruling was not binding outside the proceedings in that court. The Court believed that this argument held some appeal because when the justice court binds a defendant over for trial in district court, it is not uncommon for the prosecution and defense to relitigate any suppression rulings the justice court may have made before or during the preliminary hearing. The Court noted that it has never questioned the district court’s authority to decide those issues anew after a bind over, and it was not inclined to do so. Despite the arguments appeal in that respect, the Court further noted that it had little bearing on the question here: Is evidence that has been suppressed by the justice court before or during a preliminary hearing legal evidence that can be presented to the grand jury consistent with NRS 172.135(2)?
The Court explained that the Nevada Legislature has authorized justice courts to suppress illegally obtained evidence before or during a preliminary hearing, Grace v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 132 Nev. 511, 513-14, 375 P.3d 1017, 1018 (2016), and allowed the State to challenge the justice court’s suppression ruling through an expedited appeal to the district court, NRS 189.120; see also Grace, 132 Nev. at 518, 375 P.3d at 1021 (concluding that “NRS 189.120 plainly allows the State to appeal a justice court’s suppression order, made during a preliminary hearing, to the district court”). At the same time, the Legislature has allowed the State to proceed to a grand jury where it previously dismissed a criminal complaint voluntarily, see NRS 178.562(1) (providing that voluntary dismissal of a complaint under NRS 174.085 does not bar another prosecution for the same offense), and where the justice court has discharged a defendant on a criminal complaint after a preliminary hearing, NRS 178.562(2) (providing that “discharge of a person accused upon preliminary examination . . . does not bar the finding of an indictment”). When the State does so, it starts a new case before the grand jury. Warren v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 134 Nev. 649, 652, 427 P.3d 1033, 1036 (2018).
The Court further explained that the new proceeding before the grand jury must comply with the evidentiary constraints the Legislature has provided, such as the requirement in NRS 172.135(2) that the grand jury receive none but legal evidence. Although the Legislature has provided some exceptions to those evidentiary constraints, e.g., NRS 172.135(2)(a)-(b) (allowing the grand jury to consider certain hearsay evidence in limited circumstances), it has not made an exception for evidence suppressed by the justice court before or during a preliminary hearing on a complaint. Similarly, the Legislature has not expressly limited the legal effect of the justice court’s suppression ruling when the State starts a new case in the grand jury. The Court believed that it easily could have done so. Cf. Cal. Penal Code § 1538.5(j) (providing that a suppression ruling is not binding in subsequent probable cause proceedings, with certain exceptions, when the defendant is not held to answer at the preliminary hearing). The Court would not imply an exception or limit on the effect of the justice court’s suppression ruling from the text of the statutes allowing the State to proceed to a grand jury after a voluntary dismissal of a com plaint or discharge of a defendant upon a preliminary hearing. The Court indicated that it was reticent to imply an exception when the Legislature has expressed its desire to provide greater protection to Nevada citizens by imposing evidentiary constraints in grand jury proceedings.
The Court considered the balance struck by the Legislature in providing an expedited appeal of a justice court’s suppression ruling and limiting the evidence that a grand jury can receive, and held that when a judge suppresses evidence before or during a preliminary hearing and the State has not successfully challenged the suppression ruling, NRS 172.135(2) precludes the State from presenting the suppressed evidence to the grand jury. The Court determined that because the State did not present the grand jury with anything but the suppressed evidence, the district court manifestly abused its discretion in denying the pretrial habeas petition. See Rugamas v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev. 424, 436, 305 P.3d 887, 896 (2013) (recognizing that an indictment is fatally deficient where insufficient evidence is presented to support the probable cause determination); Robertson v. State, 84 Nev. 559, 561-62, 445 P.2d 352, 353 (1968) (recognizing that an indictment will be sustained even if inadmissible evidence was presented to the grand jury so long as “there [was] the slightest sufficient legal evidence” presented); see also State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Armstrong), 127 Nev. 927, 932, 267 P.3d 777, 780 (2011) (explaining that a lower court’s clearly erroneous interpretation or application of the law is a manifest abuse of discretion).
Accordingly, the Court granted the petition in part and directed the clerk of the court to issue a writ of mandamus instructing the district court to vacate its order denying Gathrite’s pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus and enter an order consistent with its opinion.